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THE SEARCH FOR FINALITY IN WAGE AND HOUR
LITIGATION
L. METCALFE WALLINGt

J THINK it a fair statement to say that few people, certainly

few Congressmen, imagined that the relatively simple language of the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938' providing for overtime standards and
minimum wages would proliferate so many lawsuits. The amount of
litigation in the Supreme Court alone, to say nothing of the lower courts
where the appeal machinery was not utilized voluntarily or refused by
the courts on application, is a not inconsiderable portion of the calendar. 2
To be sure, other issues than rates of pay or hours of work were involved
in many of these cases, since arguing the proper interpretation of the
Commerce Clause of the Constitution has not suddenly ceased to have
charms for the litigant.
There are various explanations of this litigiousness, both on the part
of the Administrator and individual employees, because, unlike many
regulatory statutes, private rights are conferred. 3 The fact that a half
million employers more or less, including the biggest in the country by
and large, and twenty odd million workers are subject to its provisions
certainly has not lessened the tendency to litigate.4 The failure of the
Act always to define precisely what it means has bred lawsuits. The
novel character of the legislation by which the Federal Government
enters the field of hour and wage control in a way which sets a basis
for the whole economy of the country made the stakes high. But, in my
judgment, no other single factor contributed so much to the sheer necessity of litigation, as distinguished from any inherent tendency to litigiousness on the part of the Government, employers or employees, as
the inability of anyone to say definitively what the Act means until the
highest court has spoken.
Nowhere in the Act is the Adminstrator given any power to interpret
it in a general way. To be sure Section .203 is devoted exclusively to
defining terms used in the Act and various other sections specifically
t Member of the New York Bar.
1. 52 STAT. 1060 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1940).
2. There were, e.g., 31 Supreme Court cases through 1945, which includes the earliest
period when litigation was just being commenced in the district courts.
3. 52 STAT. 1069 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1940), as amended, 61 STAT. 87, 29
U.S.C.A. § 216 (b) (Supp. 1947).
4. See Foreword, REP. ADM'R, WAGE AND HOUR AND CONTRACTS DIvisIoNs (U. S. Dep't
Labor 1946).
5. E.g., the long history of interpretation of the phrase "regular rate" of pay in § 207
dealing with overtime.

19481

WAGE AND HOUR LITIGATION

authorize the Adminstrator to breathe life into the bare flesh and bones
of certain terms6 but these sections are responsible for a numerically
small part of the cases. The important litigation, both in bulk and significance, has arisen on other points where the Administrator could legally
take no position which would protect a future litigant or create rights.7
The sheer pressure of events and the need of employers to know how
to make up next week's payroll before the round of litigation to the high
court could be completed, as well as the common sense of the situation,
led the Administrator early to adopt the policy of advising what his
enforcement position would be until the courts required him to change it.
The situation is therefore not so completely chaotic as it seems on first
blush. There is a long series of interpretative bulletins and press releases
widely distributed which made up a comprehensive, although not authoritative, body of law. Furthermore, the courts, including the Supreme
Court, have given "great weight" 8 to the Administrator's interpretation
and statements of his enforcement position so that litigants who relied
on them were often protected in subsequent suits.0
The scope of this article is limited to the interpretations and litigation
arising under the sections dealing with hours and wages because we now
have authoritative decisions by the Supreme Court which have pretty
completely pricked out on a case by case basis the delimitations in this
area of the statute. The recent decision of the Supreme Court in the
Stevedore cases'0 involving the so called "overtime on overtime" issues
has spoken the last judicial word on the problem of "regular rate" of
pay although the ink was hardly dry on the decision before there was talk
of amending the law" to cure what some regarded as judicial legislation
6. Section 206 (a) (5) authorizing the "Administrator, or his authorized reprezentative
... to make such regulations or orders as are necessary or appropriate .. ."; § 207 (b) (3)
authorizing the Administrator to determine industries of a 'seasonal nature"; § 207 (c)
authorizing the Administrator to define the area of production; § 213 (a) (1) authorizing
the Administrator to define and delimit by regulations the terms "bona fide executive,
administrative, professional, or local retailing capacity, or in the capacity of outside salesmen"; § 214 authorizing the Administrator to regulate the "employment of learners, of
apprentices, and of messengers employed exclusively in delivering letters and messages . . .
[and] of individuals whose earning capacity is impaired by age or physical or mental
deficiency or injury.... "
7. Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local 6167, 325 U.S. 161 (1945).
8. See Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 126 (1944).
9. But see Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local 6167, 325 U.S. 161 (1945) where the
reliance was futile and expensive.
10. Bay Ridge Operating Co. v. Aaron, 334 U.S. 446 (194S).
11. H.R. 6534, 94 Cong. Rec. 5892 (May 12, 1948) and S. 2728, 94 Cong. Rec. 6472
(May 24, 1948). Both bills were intended to define and limit the jurisdiction of the
courts to regulate actions arising under certain laws of the United States. They were aimed
at the re-definition of "regular rate" of pay in order to help eliminate countless suits
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and unwarranted interference with the collective bargaining process. 12
The decision was an important factor in the recent negotiations between
the various maritime unions and shipping companies ending in an injunction against a strike by the international longshoremen under the
Taft-Hartley Act following the breakdown of negotiations.18 Lawyers
may now fairly confidently advise their clients in this narrow field of
the Act and this article may be helpful in tracing the evolution as well as
stating the situation employers and employees confront today.
Now to return to the statute itself. The provisions of Sections 206
and 207 of the Act provide rather simply (1) for a sliding scale upward
of wages from 25 an hour the first year to 300 the second with the ultimate goal of 400 to be reached automatically by 1945 if not earlier by
industry committee action, and (2) a sliding scale downward for hours
from 44 the first year to 42 the second and 40 hours the third and subsequent years, after which hours work can be performed to an unlimited
amount provided a penalty rate of 50% is added to the "regular rate"
for hours beyond the specified standard.1 4 The key word here is "regular
rate."
which were expected to be based on the Court's overtime on overtime interpretation. Both
were referred to the Committee on the Judiciary in the last session of Congress and died

there but they will undoubtedly be reintroduced.
12.
U.S.
13.
14.
(a)

On this point see the pungent dissenting opinion of Mr. justice Frankfurter, 334
446, 477 (1948).
N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1948, Sports, p. 8, col. 4.
"Minimum wages; effective date
Every employer shall pay to each of his employees who is engaged in commerce
or in the production of goods for commerce wages at the following rates(1) during the first year from the effective date of this section, not less than 25
cents an hour,
(2) during the next six years from such date, not less than 30 cents an hour,
(3) after the expiration of seven years from such date, not less than 40 cents an
hour, or the rate (not less than 30 cents an hour) prescribed in the applicable
order of the Administrator issued under section 208 of this title, whichever
is lower, and
(4) at any time after the effective date of this section, not less than the rate (not
in excess of 40 cents an hour) prescribed in the applicable order of the
Administrator issued under section 208 of this title,
(5) if such employee is a home worker in Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands, not
less than the minimum piece rate prescribed by regulation or order; or, If no
such minimum piece rate is in effect, any piece rate adopted by such employer
which shall yield, to the proportion or class of employees prescribed by regulation or order, not less than the applicable minimum hourly wage rate. Such
minimum piece rates or employer piece rates shall be commensurate with, and
shall be paid in lieu of, the minimum hourly wage rate applicable under the
provisions of this section. The Administrator, or his authorized representative,
shall have power to make such regulations or orders as are necessary or
appropriate to carry out any of the provisions of this paragraph, including
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the power without limiting the generality of the foregoing, to define any
operation or occupation which is performed by such home work employees in
Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands; to establish minimum piece rates for any
operation or occupation so defined; to prescribe the method and procedure
for ascertaining and promulgating minimum piece rates; to prescribe standards
for employer piece rates, including the proportion or class of employees who
shall receive not less than the minimum hourly wage rate; to define the term
"home worker"; and to prescribe the conditions under which employers, agents,
contractors, and subcontractors -hall cause goods to be produced by home
workers.
(b) This section shall take effect upon the expiration of one hundred and twenty days
from the date of enactment of sections 201-219 of this title.
(c) The provisions of paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of subsection (a) of this section
shall be superseded in the case of any employee in Puerto Rico or the Virgin
Islands engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce only
for so long as and insofar as such employee is covered by a wage order issued
by the Administrator pursuant to the recommendations of a special industry committee appointed pursuant to section 205 (e) of this title." 52 STAT. 1062 (193S),
29 U.S.C. §206 (1940).
"Maximum hours
(a) No employer shall, except as otherwise provided in this section, employ any of his
employees who is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce--(1) for a workweek longer than forty-four hours during the first year from the
effective date of this section,
(2) for a workweek longer than forty-two hours during the second year from
such date, or
(3) for a workweek longer than forty hours after the expiration of the second
year from such date,
unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of
the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the
regular rate at which he is employed.
(b) No employer shall be deemed to have violated subsection (a) by employing any
employee for a workweek in excess of that specified in such subsection without
paying the compensation for overtime employment prescribed therein if such
employee is so employed(1) in pursuance of an agreement, made as a result of collective bargaining by
representatives of employees certified as bona fide by the National Labor
Relations Board, which provides that no employee shall be employed more
than one thousand hours during any period of twenty-six consecutive weeks,
(2) on an annual basis in pursuance of an agreement with his employer, made
as a result of collective bargaining by representatives of employees certified
as bona fide by the National Labor Relations Board, which provides that the
employee shall not be employed more than two thousand and eighty hours
during any period of fifty-two consecutive weeks, or
(3) for a period or periods of not more than fourteen workweeks in the aggregate
in any calendar year in an industry found by the Administrator to be of a
seasonal nature, and if such employee receives compensation for employment
in excess of 12 hours in any workday, or for employment in excess of 56 hours
in any workweek, as the case may be, at a rate not less than one and one-half
times the regular rate at which he is employed.
(c) In the case of an employer engaged in the first processing of milk, whey, skimmed
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Since the controversies arising out of the minimum wage provisions
of Section 206 are far less numerous and troublesome than those arising
under the overtime provisions of Section 207, let us dispose of them
first.
The first attack on the minimum wage machinery was made by the
Opp Cotton Mills, Inc.,"0 challenging the validity of the first minimum
wage order, issued under Section 208 of the Act, which established a uniform country wide minimum wage of 32Y20 an hour for the cotton
textile industry. Section 208 (b) provides for the appointment of an
"industry committee" composed of equal numbers of representatives of
management, labor and the public which "shall recommend to the Administrator the highest minimum wage rates for the industry which it
determines, having due regard to economic and competitive conditions,
will not substantially curtail employment in the industry." Section 208
(c) provides: "The industry committee shall recommend such reasonable classifications within any industry as it determines to be necessary
for the purpose of fixing for each classification within such industry the
highest minimum wage rate (not in excess of 40 cents an hour) which
(1) will not substantially curtail employment in such classification and
(2) will not give a competitive advantage to any group in the industry,
and shall recommend for each classification in the industry the highest
minimum wage rate which the committee determines will not substantially curtail employment in such classification." This subdivision goes
on to prohibit the committee from making classification within an industry and the minimum wage itself "solely on a regional basis" but the
committee and the Administrator must consider "among other relevant
factors the following: (1) competitive conditions as affected by transportation, living and production costs; (2) the wages established for
milk, or cream into dairy products, or in the ginning and compressing of cotton,
or in the processing of cottonseed, or in the processing of sugar beets, sugar beet
molasses, sugarcane, or maple sap, into sugar (but not refined sugar) or into syrup,
the provisions of subsection (a) shall not apply to his employees in any place of
employment where he is so engaged; and in the case of an employer engaged in
the first processing of, or in canning or packing, perishable or seasonal fresh fruits
or vegetables, or in the first processing, within the area of production (as defined
by the Administrator), of any agricultural or horticultural commodity during
seasonal operations, or in handling, slaughtering, or dressing poultry or livestock,
the provisions of subsection (a), during a period or periods of not more than
fourteen workweeks in the aggregate in any calendar year, shall not apply to his
employees in any place of employment where he is so engaged.
(d) This section shall take effect upon the expiration of one hundred and twenty days
from the date of enactment of sections 201-219 of this title." 52 STAT. 1063 (1938),
as amended, 55 STAT. 756 (1941), 29 U.S.C. § 207 (Supp. 1946).
15. Opp Cotton Mills, Inc., v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126 (1941).
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work of like or comparable character by collective labor agreements negotiated between employers and employees by representatives of their
own choosing; and (3) the wages paid for work of like or comparable
character by employers who voluntarily maintain minimum wage standards in the industry." The committee is further prohibited from adopting a classification on the basis of age or sex.
The Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Stone, sweepingly
vindicated the constitutionality of the Act and brushed aside such suggestions as (1) the invalidity of the industry committee machinery and
its relation to the Administrator's ultimate fixing of the minimum wage
based on improper delegation of legislative power, (2) the argument that
the appointment of the industry committee was void because the Administrator after its appointment changed the definition of the industry
by eliminating the woolen industry from the definition of the textile
industry, and (3) the contention that "due regard to the geographical
regions in which the industry was carried on" was not given by the Administrator in the appointment of the committee.
There has been no further doubt of the validity of the minimum wage
sections of the Act but a unique contention was made in United States v.
Rosenwasser'0 that the Act did not apply to piece rates because of the
difficulty of translating them into hourly rates for the purpose of finding
whether the required minimum rate had been paid. The Court made short
shrift of this novel and groundless claim with a brief opinion in which
all the Justices concurred except Mr. Justice Roberts. The case is interesting chiefly because of the startling nature of the defense and because it involved a criminal indictment.
Section 208 (f) requires the Administrator to phrase his minimum
wage orders in such a way and with such conditions that circumvention
of their terms will be prevented."7 This is a necessary and proper power
to prevent nullification of the Congressional intent. There had been a
long history of abuse in certain hand industries where industrial homework or work performed away from the factory on the premises of the
worker, was characteristic. Studies had been made over a period of years
on the unhealthy, unsanitary conditions under which goods were turned
out with the labor of young children in the family assisting their elders
to the detriment of their health. It had been amply demonstrated, if
16. 323 U.S. 360 (1945).
17. 52 STAT. 1064 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 208 (f) (1940). "Orders issued under this
section shall define the industries and classifications therein to which they are to apply,
and shall contain such terms and conditions as the Administrator finds necessary to carry
out the purposes of such orders, to prevent the circumvention or evasion thereof, and to
safeguard the minimum wage rates established therein."
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demonstration were needed, that control of the conditions of such homework, including the hours and wages and child labor, was virtually impossible, certainly not effective. Accordingly the Administrator as a
condition in his minimum wage order for the embroidery industry prohibited homework on the ground that there would otherwise be "circumvention or evasion thereof." This condition was challenged on the
grounds among others that the power not being specifically delegated
could not be implied and that the presence of specific language covering the industrial homework situation in one draft of the Bill before a
Congressional Committee indicated Congress had rejected the idea of
control or prohibition of industrial homework. 18 The Supreme Court
found little difficulty in overriding the protest and validating the Administator's wage order including the offensive part. Although a relatively strong showing was made that present wage scales were above the
minimum and that the threat to the standard was therefore remote, the
long history of low wage conditions in the homework industries and the
competition with factory work where the full burden of taxes, plant
and overhead had to be fully borne undoubtedly influenced the justices.
"The posture of the case therefore compels acceptance of the Administrator's position that, without the prohibition, the wage rate cannot be
maintained, and that circumvention and evasion cannot be prevented.
...In this light petitioners' position is, in effect, that the statute cannot
be applied to this industry. Their argument is not put in those terms.
It comes to that. So to state it is to answer it. The industry is covered
by the Act." 9
The other minimum wage problems such as whether overtime can be
paid on the bare minimum as the "regular rate" or actual earning rate of
the employee are bound up with the overtime problems, which of course
ultimately resolve themselves into a question of wages, so we can pass
on to Section 207. We shall have to give our attention not only to the
problem of how to compute overtime and what is "regular time" and
"overtime" but what goes into time worked for which the employer is
obligated to pay.
As the automatic sliding scale of statutory hours began to drop from
the original 44 to 40, the shoe began to pinch. It became worthwhile
to devise schemes to cut down the cost of overtime and to try to avoid
an increase in the wage cost as was obviously intended by the statute. 0
18. Gemsco v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244 (1945).
19.

Id. at 255.

20. Section 218 of the Act reads in part: "No provision [of this Act] shall justify any
employer in reducing a wage paid by him which is in excess of the applicable minimum
wage under [this Act] . . . or justify any employer in increasing hours of employment
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The pious declaration of intent, however, carried no penalties for its
violation so that in practice an employer has never been restrained by
court action from making a wage cut so long as he did not go below
the minimum.
One of the best known and most popular of the various plans devised
to provide stability of earnings was the Belo plan 2' adopted by a Dallas
newspaper. This ingenious plan resulted in a weekly guaranty of $40
regardless of the number of hours actually worked, although the basic
rate of pay was recited to be 670 pet hour. In order to earn more than
$40 the employee would have to work at least 543/2 hours. This of course
had the effect of rendering inapplicable the so-called regular rate of
670 in any week where the employee worked less than 44 hours (at
that time the maximum before the overtime penalty). In such short work
weeks the employee would receive more than 67 an hour (that is
the quotient obtained by dividing the hours actually worked into $40).
If the hours exceeded 44, the amount in excess of 670 an hour could
be denominated overtime but would be based not on the regular rate
provision of the contract (67¢) but on the guaranty. If the theory of
the statute is that hours worked beyond the statutory work week are
designed to be more costly to the employer, fifty per cent more costly,
as the Court said in a subsequent case-- was the intent, then it seemed
reasonable to conclude that this plan under which there was no greater
expense to the employer for the forty-fifth hour than for the forty-fourth
must fall. The Court however upheld the plan by a 5-4 decision, Mr.
Justice Byrnes for the majority saying that the regular rate may be
established by contract.' It was held not to be objectionable that the
intent may have been to permit, insofar as possible, the payment of the
same weekly wage as that paid prior to the Act. 4 The majority were
not worried by any inconsistency between a $40 guaranty and a 67
"regular rate." They were obviously influenced by the security value
to the employee of a regular weekly income, well above the then minimum of $10 and the assumption that the unorganized employees who
assented to the new arrangement by not protesting the employer's letter
outlining it in fact welcomed it. The majority emphasized, as pointed
out in the dissenting opinion, that "Congress has said nothing to prevent
maintained by him which are shorter than the maximum hours applicable [under this
Act]. ..
21. Walling v. A. H. Belo Corp., 316 U.S. 624 (1942). The Supreme Court specifically
refused to regard the plan as an evasion of the Act and gave it its 5-4 blessing.
22. Walling v. Youngerman-Reynolds Hardwood Co., 325 U.S. 419, 423 (1945).

23. But cf. Bay Ridge Operating Co. v. Aaron, 334 U. S, 446 (1948), where it was
held that the Court will go behind the contract to find the reality.
24. Section 218 of the Act to the contrary notwithstanding.
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this desirable objective" and that "employer and employees have agreed
upon an arrangement which has proven mutually satisfactory."2 5 It is
to be noted that the case was brought by the Administrator to enjoin
the employer's practice, not by an employee to recover underpayment
of wages, and it is an interesting speculation whether the result would
have been the same had the record been explicit that the employees were
dissatisfied as would have been the case had they brought suit themselves.
At any rate, Mr. Justice Reed who wrote the companion decision handed
down the same day refused to accept the majority's premise and vigorously contended in his dissenting opinion that it could not be reconciled
with his opinion in the Misse 2 6 case in which all the Court joined except
Mr. Justice Roberts who dissented without opinion, the Chief Justice
concurring in the result, equally without opinion.
The Missel case was brought by a rate clerk of a motor transportation
company for statutory overtime pay and it was abundantly clear that
he had not acquiesced in his constant wage of $27.50 a week regardless
of the hours he worked. As a matter of fact they fluctuated dizzily,
running as high as 80 hours a week and averaging 65. The Court invalidated the constant wage plan pointing out that the statutory objective
of making it costly to work employees long weeks was not beyond the
constitutional power and that the obligation was to pay the premium
not on the statutory minimum as base, or the "regular rate" but on the
rate found by dividing the hours worked each week into the weekly wage.
This was exactly the Administrator's interpretation which he had uniformly followed in his enforcement activities and of which he had failed
to convince the requisite five justices in the Belo case. The inconsistency was readily apparent to almost everyone and the Administrator
solved his dilemma of interpretation and implementation of the decision
by construing narrowly the Belo doctrine and limiting its application to
situations which fitted within its four corners and where all elements
were present. As a practical matter, if not also a legal one, no other
solution was possible in view of the generality of the holding in Missell,
the narrowness of the holding in Belo, and the necessity for rule of thumb
guidance of laymen, employers trying to know how to figure their payrolls, employees to know their rights, and government inspectors to know
their duties. The language of the Court: "We have no doubt that pay
by the week, to be reduced by some method of computation to hourly
rates, was also covered by the Act" is a prophetic foreshadowing of the
holding later in the Rosenwasser case that piece rates are equally covered.
The problem of whether the additional amount plus the withheld wages
25.
26.

Walling v. A. H. Belo Corp., 316 U.S. 624, 635 (1942).
Overnight Motor Transportation Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572 (1942).
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is true liquidated damages or a penalty was solved in favor of the former.
There was no violation of due process regardless of the bona fides or
reasonableness of the employer's assumption that his weekly wage scheme
had been authorized by the statute.
In some ways the victory was a hollow one for employees because there
is a kind of "Alice in Wonderland" situation with the hourly rate
decreasing the longer the employee works. Since the wage remains constant the quotient is bound to be smaller as the divisor increases. We
shall never know whether the Court would have sustained an arbitrary
"regular rate" to be determined by dividing the statutory hours into the
weekly wage on a non-fluctuating basis since the Administrator had never
so interpreted the statute and that possibility was not before the Court.
Subsequent pronouncements of the Court, particularly in two cases,
strongly hinted that the Belo doctrine was not a strong reed for an employer to lean on, that it was no longer good law and would be specifically
overruled in a case squarely raising the question, if indeed it had not
already been so weakened as not to represent the Court's current view.
The first of these two cases, decided the same day, Walling v. Yongcrman-Reynolds Hardwood Co., involved the validity of a wage plan under
which the basic or regular rate was recited to be 350 an hour although
the incentive plan coupled with it actually resulted over the six month
period before the trial of the case in earnings for the stackers of lumber
under the guaranteed piece rates of 70 and 80 per thousand averaging
59¢ an hour including the hours beyond the statutory maximum. The
Court brushed aside the employer's contention that its contract "regular
rate" held despite the higher earnings from the piece rates and that it
was complying with the Act since it was in fact paying overtime on at
least the then minimum hourly rate. The irrelevance of the contract rate
in these circumstances surprised many lawyers and employers who bad
been following the Belo doctrine but was firmly stated by the Court:
"The regular rate by its very nature must reflect all payments which
the parties have agreed shall be received regularly during the workweek,
exclusive of overtime payments. It is not an arbitrary label chosen by
the parties; it is an actual fact. Once the parties have decided upon the
amount of wages and the mode of payment the determination of the
regular rate becomes a matter of mathematical computation, the result
of which is unaffected by any designation of a contrary 'regular rate' in
the wage contracts.... The 35-cent per hour 'regular rate' fixed by the
contracts is obviously an artificial one, however bona fide it may have
been in origin. Except in the extremely unlikely situation of the piece
27. 325 U.S. 419 (1945).
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work wages falling below a 35-cent per hour figure, this 'regular rate' is
never actually paid."28 Then came the stunning blow: "This Court's
decision in Walling v. Belo Corp., 316 U. S. 624, lends no support to
respondent's position. The particular wage agreements there involved
were upheld because it was felt that in fixing a rate of 670 an hour
the contracts did in fact set the actual regular rate at which the workers
were employed. The case is no authority, however, for the proposition
that the regular rate may be fixed by contract at a point completely
unrelated to the payments actually and normally received each week by
-the employees."29
One has to confess that the facts in Belo seemed to indicate that the
"regular rate" was nearly as "completely unrelated to the payments actually and normally received each week by the employees" as in the case
0
at bar. Walling v. Harnisckfeger Corp.3
seemed to complete the nailing
of the coffin on poor Belo and provide as decent an interment as was
possible under the embarrassing circumstances. Here there was a collective bargaining contract excluding incentive earnings from the "regular rate" for the purpose of figuring overtime pay specifically but also
for all purposes. 3 Had not the Belo doctrine been carefully observed
in the framing of the agreement? The Court said, however: "No contract
designation of the base rate as the 'regular rate' can negative the fact
that these employees do in fact regularly receive the higher rate. To
compute overtime compensation from the lower and unreceived rate is
not only unrealistic but is destructive of the legislative intent. A full
50% increase in labor costs and a full 50% wage premium, which were
meant to flow from the operation of § 7(a), are impossible of achievement under such a computation ....
The conclusion that only the minimum hourly rate constitutes the regular rate opens an easy path for
-evading the plain design of § 7(a). We cannot sanction such a patent
disregard of statutory duties. . . . Until that premium [for overtime
hours] is 50% of the actual hourly rate received from all regular sources
§ 7(a) has not been satisfied." 3 Obviously the only conclusion to draw
is that a plan which does not include bonuses is "unrealistic" and "artificial" and therefore "evasive" but a plan which has no bonuses but still
does not reflect the employee's earning capacity where his hours vary
although his weekly guaranty does not is not "evasive."
28.

Id. at 424.

29.

Id. at 426.

30.

325 U.S. 427 (1945).

31. Id. at 430. ". . . 'the parties agree that, for all purposes, the regular rate of pay
at which each employee who participates in an incentive plan is employed, is the base
rate of each such employee.'"
32. 325 U.S. 427, 430 (1945).
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The corpse proved surprisingly vital and came fully back to life when
the Court expressed surprise that anyone could have thought Belo was
not good law by validating another wage guaranty plan under which 84
hours had to be worked before the overtime rate had any reality.' The
Court was squarely asked to overrule Belo but the Chief Justice blandly
stated for the Court: "There is nothing here to suggest different treatment of the two cases." 34 "Indeed it would seem that the Court's opinions
in these cases [Walling v. HarnisclifegerCorp., Walling v. YoungcrmanReynolds Hardwood Co. and Overnight Motor Transportation Co. v.
Missel supra] far from undermining Belo, showed an affirmative concern
that language appropriate to the situations then before us should not be
extended to the different situation involved in this and the Belo case."'
Although the Court made it clear it had considered the "substantially
same" argument in Belo and rejected it, it did give a clue to its thinking:
"Moreover, our holding in Belo has been a rule of decision in this Court
for five years, and recognized as such on each appropriate occasion.
Knowing of the Belo decision, the Congress has permitted § 7(a) to
stand unmodified and the courts have applied it as so construed. Employers and employees (including those involved in this case) have regulated their affairs on the faith of it. Even if we doubted the wisdom of
the Belo decision as an original proposition, we should not be inclined
to depart from it at this time." 30
0
Perhaps a new Chief Justice took judicial notice of the criticism of
the Court's changeableness in some of its decisions in recent years and
thought it wise judicial statesmanship to invoke the doctrine of stare
decisis. Three of his brethren however were unconvinced. Mr. Justice
Rutledge would "restrict the effects of that decision [Belo] narrowly to
the factual situation presented ' 3 7 but went along with the Court reluctantly because the "parties ... and no doubt.., others [had relied upon
it] in making their arrangements." 3 He found the facts indistinguishable
from those in Belo. Mr. Justice Murphy and Mr. Justice Black flatly
said it was "impossible" to square the Halliburton wage scheme with
Section 7; that Belo was "erroneous" and "irreconcilable" and "should
therefore be overruled. Otherwise we shall be perpetuating and augmenting the unrealities and confusion which have marked the application of
the doctrine of that case."139
33.
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The majority view would seem to be the last act in the "regular rate"
drama but there was to be an epilogue. It would seem almost impossible
for still another new situation to arise but the stevedore industry provided it. Since 1916 the longshoremen have had an agreement providing
for a higher rate of pay, frequently but by no means universally, 50%
more than the "day rate." As a matter of fact since 1887 some premium
rate for night work has been paid and the motive for so doing was
admittedly to discourage night work. The contracts in question 0 provided a basic work week of 44 hours (at the time the statutory standard)
with "overtime" at the rate of a 50% premium for hours worked after
5 p. m. and before 8 a. m. on weekdays and after 12 noon on Saturday,
and all day Sunday. Meal hours and designated holidays were to be
considered "overtime," to which the special rate attached. There is no
question that originally and up until the war period work at these hours
was abnormal. For instance from 1932 to 1937, 80% of all time worked
was in the straight time hours and only 22 % of the time worked after
5 p. m. was worked by men who had worked no previous straight time.
During the war years, however, only 55% of the total work fell within
the contract straight time hours. Unfortunately for the companies in
this litigation many of the workweeks showed time exclusively outside
"regular" hours. The companies were in the embarrassing position of
having to pitch their case on tl~ese facts wholly or partially present: (1)
as to particular claimants, no regular hours were worked; (2) all time
for the first 40 hours was outside the "regular" hours, that is between
5 p. m. and 8 a. m. or Saturday afternoons or Sundays; (3) the contract
rate and actual rate were the same for the 1st hour as for the 41st; in
short, overtime and straight time were the same. This was obviously
flying in the face of the congressional intent and the earlier decisions
making it clear that overtime was designed to be a penalty to discourage
hours beyond 40, an added expense in the labor cost, and a 50% higher
rate than the straight time regular hours up to 40. As the Court rephrased what it had said in previous cases, overtime is simply "Extra
pay for work because of previous work for a specified number of hours
in the workweek
or workday whether the hours are specified by contract
41
,or statute."
Here again the question was whether the contract itself would govern
,or whether the Court would look behind its terminology. It is not enough
to call compensation "overtime"; it must meet the test of being hours
beyond the normal regular working hours or the "actual and regular
work week," as the Court expressed it in Walling v. Helmerich & Payne
40.

See note 10 supra.
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334 U.S. 446, 449 n. 2 (1948).
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This last case involved the "Paxon split day plan" under which
the day was arbitrarily divided in two and the first half of the day was
arbitrarily called straight time and the second half overtime. This had
the simple merit of maintaining the same labor cost after as before the
statutory overtime requirements and involved merely a bookkeeping
entry. The Court again pointed out that "Only in the extremely unlikely
case where an employee's tours [shifts] totaled more than 80 hours in
a week did he become entitled to any pay in addition to the regular tour
wages that he would have received prior to the adoption of the split-day
plan.... Hence, since the wages under the old system and under the
split-day plan were identical, the original tour rates could be used as
the simple method of computing wages for each pay period. The actual
and regular workweek was accordingly shorn of all significance."" That
overtime is not the same as straight time and that the 41st hour
must cost the employer more than the 1st had been once more empha4
sized in dismissing the split day plan as obviously an evasive device
"But respondent's plan made no effort to base the regular rate upon the
wages actually received or upon the hours actually and regularly spent
each week in working. Nor did it attempt to apply the regular rate to
the first 40 hours actually and regularly worked. Instead the plan provided for a fictitious regular rate consisting of a figure somewhat lower
than the rate actually received. This illusory rate was arbitrarily allocated to the first portion of each day's regular labor; the latter portion
was designated 'overtime' and called for compensation at a rate one
and one-half times the fictitious regular rate. 4 3
The vice in the Bay Ridge case was not so much that the regular
rate was fictitious as that it failed to take into account that the simple
answer to the dilemma of the regular rate and contract overtime rate
being the same is that the "overtime rate" is really a premium rate for
night and weekend work, what the Court called "disagreeable hours."4 To
the argument that the parties had made an honest agreement as equals
which arose out of long standing industrial practice and which should
not therefore be disturbed, a point strongly stressed by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter for the minority of three, the Court merely said that the
parties can not substitute their concept of overtime for the congressional
one (as interpreted by the Court of course). There is no gainsaying
the power of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion and his moral
Inc.
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fervor in upholding the sacredness of collective bargaining. He was on
strong practical ground in pointing out the disruptive effects of prohibiting what a strong union had not only ascquiesced in but took the extraordinary position of fighting for alongside the employer-respondent despite the financial interest of its members in benefiting by any additional
overtime pay the Court might order if the contract were nullified on
this point. They were fighting however not only a losing battle but a
lost battle. Mr. Justice Jackson had put everyone on ample notice in
his dissent several years ago in the Jewell Ridge case 47 following the
earlier Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. case48 that collective bargaining
was crimped insofar as it conflicted with what the Court said the statute
meant. It should have been abundantly clear that union agreements had
to conform to the letter as well as the spirit of the law and that good
intentions or the approval of the Administrator were not enough. In
the Jewell Ridge case it was emphasized that the United Mine Workers
Union had bargained for years on the basis of wages fixed on a face-toface basis rather than a portal-to-portal basis. Historically, the American coal miner had obtained a proportionately higher rate for his productive work at the face of the mine than he would have obtained had
his contract covered his travel from the portal to the face or working
place and return as is the custom in the European mines. This was
undisputed and was emphasized in the now famous Houck letter written
by the United Mine Workers to the Administrator asking him not to
upset collective bargaining by requiring portal-to-portal pay under the
Act instead of merely face-to-face. The Administrator replied that such
an interpretation of the Act would not be "unreasonable" and generally
gave the impression that his administrative policy would be to keep
hands off and allow the parties long standing arrangements to be undisturbed. Notwithstanding the Court brushed this defense aside and
made it clear that the language of the Act as interpreted by the Court
was what prevailed, not the contract of the parties or the enforcement
policy of the Administrator or his view of what was "reasonable." This
had been clearly foreshadowed in the earlier Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R.
case where the factual situation was much less compelling. There the
Court found no evidence of "immemorial custom" by collective bargaining as there had been no bona fide independent unions previously; but
even if there had, said the Court, such evidence was immaterial. "The
Fair Labor Standards Act was not designed to codify or perpetuate
those customs and contracts which allow an employer to claim all of
an employee's time while compensating him for only a part of it ...
47.
48.

Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local 6167, 325 U.S. 161, 170 (1945).
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Any custom or contract falling short of that basic policy, like an agreement to pay less than the minimum wage requirements, cannot be utilized
This does not foreto deprive employees of their statutory rights ....
close, of course, reasonable provisions of contract or custom governing
the computation of work hours where precisely accurate computation is
difficult or impossible."4 9 This last accounting assurance was cold comfort
to the mining companies.
In the Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. case the Court had laid down
definite criteria for deciding what is working time: "And, in the absence
of a contrary legislative expression, we cannot assume that Congress
here was referring to work or employment other than those words are
commonly used-as meaning physical or mental exertion (whether burdensome or not) controlled or required by the employer and pursued
necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the employer and his
business."" o
But it does not require even "physical or mental exertion" in all cases.
In Armour & Co. v. Wantock 1 and Skidmore v. Swift & Co.5 2 jointly
considered by the Court the following year idleness is enough if it is
for the employer's "benefit" and so treated by the parties. The Court
refused to be biased by its own language in the Tennessee Coal, Iron &
R.R. case about "mental or physical exertion" in its application to "other
facts." " . . . an employer, if he chooses, may hire a man to do nothing,
or to do nothing but wait for something to happen. Refraining from
other activity often is a factor of instant readiness to serve, and idleness
plays a part in all employment in a standby capacity [private company
firemen hired to be available if fire broke out were involved]. Readiness
to serve may be hired, quite as much as service itself, and time spent
lying in wait for threats to the safety of the employer's property may
be treated by the parties as a benefit to the employer.""2 To be sure the
Court was guided by the Administrator's Interpretative Bulletin No. 1354
which had suggested certain standards for guidance in employment where
waiting time was customary and required by the nature of the job itself
and that the agreement of the parties would be an important consideration. In stating that the Administrator's "policies and standards" are
"entitled to respect" even though they are "not reached by trial in
adversary form" the Court indicated that "the rulings, interpretations,
49. Id. at 602.
50. Id. at 598.
51.
52.
53.
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and opinions of the Administrator under the Act, while not controlling
upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of
experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may
properly resort for guidance.""sa
It therefore becomes important to see what the Administrator has
said he thinks the Bay Ridge decision means. But before we do that,
it will be interesting to review the procedure under which cost plus contracts of the sort involved in the Stevedore cases were handled by the
various agencies of the Government. Although the Administrator, as we
have seen, can give only an advisory opinion, it has become customary
for the courts, labor and management, and most agencies of the Government as a matter of comity and courtesy to follow the Administrator's
interpretation unless they thought it patently wrong. From time to time,
however, the War and Navy Departments, the War Shipping Administration, and other agencies disagreed with the Administrator and followed a contrary rule. This of course they were legally entitled to do
and their lawyers could make their own prognostications without binding
in any way the Administrator. This was done to a considerable extent
in the field of cost plus contracts. The Department of Justice, as the
legal arm of the Government, was frequently faced with the dilemma,
where the Government was divided, of defending a suit by employees
against a cost plus contractor where the Government would have to pay
the bill and so was the real defendant. The War Department, for
example, might contest coverage of the contract in question under the
Act while the Administrator was asserting it. Even more embarrassing
might be a situation where the Department of Justice bringing criminal
action at the request of the Administrator on one theory was asked by
a war agency to assert precisely the opposite in a civil action where the
government would have to foot any additional labor cost resulting from
the contractor's failure to observe the law. The contractor's lot might
even be the unenviable one of being told one thing by the Administrator
and the opposite by another agency of government as was precisely the
case in the stevedore litigation. The War Shipping Administration chose
to ignore the Administrator's interpretation for which it substituted its
own that the contracts in the longshoreing industry squared with the Act.
It was obviously unseemly that the Government's own dirty linen should
be washed in public and the inability of its officers to agree exposed.
The solution of the dilemma adopted was an interdepartmental agreementO6 among certain war agencies, the Wage and Hour Division, and
55. Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126 (1944).
56. Unfortunately the text of this agreement has not been made public and so Is not
available.
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the Department of Justice. Under this, the Department of Justice decided which one of the conflicting interpretations it would adopt for the
purpose of defending the claim against the cost plus contractor and in
reality the Government itself. The several agencies would then be bound
only for the purposes of the particular lawsuit and could assert their
views in other matters. All the agencies agreed not to participate directly
in the lawsuit, the Service agencies, for instance, through their counsel
in uniform, or the Wage and Hour Administrator through amici briefs.
This meant that the Department of Justice was free to test out in a
court action a different theory of coverage than the Administrator had
been asserting but it did not remove from the Administrator his statutory
right and duty to administer the law, a function which he could not
abdicate to the Department of Justice or any other agency even had
he been so disposed. In the Bay Ridge case the Adminiistrator's guess
and advice that the Court would hold as it did and suggestion that the
contracts be revised to conform indubitably with the law were not heeded
and it was decided to contest the claims on the theory that the contracts
in question provided true overtime and not premium or night shift differential pay. Since large amounts of back pay were involved and potential claims in the Atlantic, Pacific, Gulf and Caribbean areas under
similar contracts the decision was not easy for the Department of Justice.
They had a duty to save money for the Government wherever they felt
the claim was invalid as well as to support the proper interpretation of
the statute. To their credit as lawyers it must be said that they persuaded three justices to agree with them. In the lawsuit there was the
unusual lineup of the Department of Justice, the War Shipping Administration and the International Longshoremen's Union, which took the unprecedented step of testifying in favor of the employer's position and
asking the Court to honor the contracts as complying with the Act, on
one side and the actual employee litigants on the other.
Now what did the Court hold? "Each respondent is entitled to receive
compensation for his hours worked in excess of forty at one and a half
times his regular rate, computed as the weighted average of the rates
worked during the week."5 7 Simply stated, this means the so-called overtime or shift differential and premium rate, as the Court found it to be,
can not be credited to wipe out statutory overtime but must itself become a part of the "regular rate" on which overtime is to be computed.
Herein lies the basis for the charge that "overtime on overtime" is being
required by the Court. This is so only if one has begged the question
by refusing to accept the Court's finding that this is not premium pay
for "disagreeable hours" or dangerous work such as explosives.
57. 334 U.S. 446, 476 (1948).
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Although the Administrator has twice postponed the effective date of
his enforcement policy 5 pending consideration by the Court of the petition to reopen the case, the Supreme Court on October 11, 1948 rejected
the petition and the Administrator has announced he will enforce his
new position on October 18, 194860 so his view is helpful and important
to people who will live under the decision and is "entitled to respect."
In the first place the Administrator stated June 8, 1948 that "the effect
will not be as far reaching as some employer representatives have
claimed" and 'Except for the matter of Saturday, Sunday, and holiday
pay ...

the problem is largely restricted to the stevedoring business,"' 0

a view which the author independently took in an article prepared shortly
after the decision. 6' The Administrator "withdrew" his "interpretations
(expressed in paragraphs 69 and 70 of Intepretative Bulletin No. 4 and
elsewhere) insofar as such extra payments are made because of the undesirable hours when the work is performed rather than because the
hours are in excess of a specified standard." 2 He emphasized however
that "extra pay ...

for hours worked in any day or week in excess of a

bona fide standard is not part of the base wages on which overtime must
be computed under the Fair Labor Standards Act, and can be credited
toward the extra compensation required by the Act for work beyond 40
hours in a workweek.11 3 This allows crediting for daily or weekly overtime paid under a seven hour day 35 hour week collective bargaining
agreement. This conclusion seems sound.
If one may venture further into the realm of prophecy with no guide
save his instincts as a lawyer and his experience as Administrator before
the courts during the major part of the period when the final Supreme
Court decisions came down, it can be predicted:
(1) The courts will narrowly limit the application of the Bay Ridge doctrine (as I have tried to show far from a novel one) to the same or closely
similar facts.
(2) Saturday, Sunday and holiday pay "as such" are no longer creditable
against statutory overtime.
58. DEP'T LABOR PRESS RELEASE No. 157, June 28, 1948 and No. 167, Sept. 14, 1948
(Wage and Hour and Contracts Division).
59. Ibid. See also DEP'T LABOR PRESS RELEASE No. 169, Oct. 11, 1948 (Wage and Hour
and Contracts Division).
60.
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(3) They must follow time previously scheduled and worked and be therefore in excess of straight time and not just "disagreeable hours."
(4) Workweeks should begin if possible on Monday so that Saturday and
Sunday work will be in fact overtime periods at the end of the workweek rather
than in the middle as in a workweek beginning Thursday.
(5) Daily overtime agreements with special rates should follow not precede
the regular work day and the premium should be for exceeding the normal or
working hours rather than for work before a special time, e.g., 8 a.m.
(6) The contract should be as explicit as possible in conforming to the
simple requirements laid down by the Supreme Court and the practice under it
should not vary significantly from the contract.
(7) Finally, all contracts and oral understandings should be carefully examined by counsel and revised where necessary, bearing in mind, too, the importance of making no admissions by implication of previous failure to comply,
which might invite a lawsuit for back wages under Section 216 (b).
Although we shall probably hear more about the Bay Ridge case and
overtime pay problems,"4 these precautions ought to prevent future
trouble. Unless Congress changes the law, it seems reasonable, despite
the years of litigation on two seemingly simple statutory provisions dealing with minimum wages and maximum hours, to conclude that almost the
final word, that finality we have been pursuing throughout this article,
has in fact been spoken.
64. See note 11 supra.

